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1. Introduction
Despite the fact that pipelines offer a safe, economical way to transport natural gas and dangerous liquids, pipeline leaks
and ruptures can result in disastrous consequences. Pipelines can be susceptible to different metallurgical failure
mechanisms including but not limited to manufacturing defects, third party damage, and corrosion. Understanding these
failure mechanisms is critical to mitigating risk of future incidents and managing the future integrity of the pipeline. The
world is experiencing a signiﬁcant change in the pipeline business [1–3], debating the need to continue to transport our oil
and gas through ageing pipelines while facing, at the same time, to amuch stringent regulatory standard. Pipelines have, and
will, fail, for one reason or the other. Recent failures in the USA [4], high pressure natural gas transmission pipeline in
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A B S T R A C T
Incident involving failures of ASTM A53 carbon steel (CS) pipe, connected to pressure
safety valve (PSV) and carrying raw gas has caused serious supply disruption. This study
was performed to identify the most probable cause of the pipe failure. It was conducted by
reviewing the existing design, construction data and pipe material analysis using non-
destructive techniques such as VT, PT, MT and UT alongwithmetallographic, hardness and
microscopic analysis. The investigation revealed that excessive material loss has occurred
in both failure and its adjacent regions due to abrasive grinding, resulting in the formation
of a through thickness ﬂaw. These grindings were performed to accommodate the pre-
installed piping spool to avoid alteration in the pipe position. RCA demonstrated that this
rapid thinning of the steel pipe body later led to its failure. Metallurgical study using
photomicrograph shows that the morphology of the steel material was consistent and did
not show any evidence of internal corrosion or micro fractures. Further damage to the
surface of already excessively reduced thickness occurred due to nominal pipe vibration
and atmospheric effect during service. The research work described in the paper has a
signiﬁcant meaning to recognize the root cause of such failures in CS pipes and through
given recommendations to eliminate future such happenings.
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northern part of Pakistan [5], a T-shape natural gas pipeline network near gas extraction plant in northernMexico [6], similar
pipe in Kuwait [7] and the API 5L X46 pipe in Brazil [8] are the few examples of such cases. Extensive pipeline failure data
from USA is shown and reported in Fig. 1. Excavation damage being termed as the highest cause of pipeline failures
contributed 24% to overall failures. More of such cases are reported and discussed critically elsewhere [10–13].
In this paper, RCA of the fractured 200 scheduled 80 CS pipe of a typical oil & gas industry is performed. Through the visual
and microscopic investigation, it can be estimated that excessive material loss has occurred in both failure and its adjacent
regions, resulting in the formation of a through thickness ﬂaw. To identify the root causes of the CS pipe fracture, thematerial
and mechanical properties of the fractured pipe were ﬁrst investigated. Hypotheses for the causes of the fracture are
presented. Finally, based on this RCA, methods to prevent future fracture of the same pipe are suggested.
2. Background of the incident
The location of the ASTM A53 carbon steel gas pipe (O.D 2.37500 and I.D. 0.9500) leak was evident after the personnel from
an oil & gas utility company in the north-east part of Pakistan observed that excessive leakage of raw gas took place from the
ruptured site. The fractured piping was resting on a CS C-channel support that includes two L-shaped CS side supports and
welded with the beam to form the major foundation for the main pipeline. Fig. 2 gives schematic details of the location of
pipeline and its supports. Prompt actionwas taken and the leakagewas immediately isolated through valve. A teamwas later
sent to excavate the site at the incident area. This was carried out in order to locate the exact source of the leakage, to rectify
and repair the damaged pipe and to make a proper record of the failure or damage for further investigation. This paper
presents ﬁndings, probable cause of failure and conclusions concerning the failure of the pipe.
3. Methodology
Four fundamental aspects of RCAwere taken into consideration while performing this inspection. First is the background
information, which caters in the form of design and construction data that provide basic formation for understanding the
sequence of events and operational conditions that might have led to the failures of the pipes. This study was later followed
by physical inspection of specimen, recorded photos and subsequent observation of the actual failed pipe section. This has
been conducted in order to locate the actual position and orientation of pipe and to reconstruct the event that leads to the
[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]
Fig. 1. Pipeline failure data from USA (1987–2006) [9].
[(Fig._2)TD$FIG]
Fig. 2. Schematic details.
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failure. Next, the metallurgical analysis of pipe was performed on the pipe section and its surrounding failure area, followed
by standard non-destructive testing (NDT) inspection techniques, including visual, penetrant testing, thickness
measurement using ultrasonic technique and hardness measurement at the selected locations of the fractured pipe.
4. Findings and discussion
4.1. Review of the background information
Upon the discovery of the incident location area, itwas evident that the fractured pipingwas resting on aCS C-channel
support that includes two L-shaped CS side supports and welded with the beam to form the major foundation for the
main pipeline. The pipe was carrying raw gas at about 2500 PSI pressure, prior to shutdown. The fractured gas pipe was
made of carbon steel manufactured with speciﬁcation of API 5L. The surface texture of main failure region exhibits a
blend of shiny and uneven proﬁle. Excessive grinding was also observed at the C-channel support that was probably
carried out to accommodate the pre-installed piping spool, in order to avoid the alteration in pipe position and to rest
properly on support; this, however, leads to a severe pipe thickness loss adjacent to one of the L-shaped welded CS side
support.
There were four possible reasons initially given as the possible root causes of the failures, which are:
i. Manufacturing defect.
ii. Third party damage.
iii. Pipeline material defect.
iv. Leaking gas pipe impact.
As per company records, standard manufacturing procedures that require proper coating, sound cathodic protection
system and other pipeline integrity measures have been appropriately complied during manufacturing, construction and
pipe laying process. This diminished the possibility of the manufacturing defects.
On the possibility of third partyworks or acts, initial discussionwith the oil & gas utility company personnel and available
operational records dismissed that this had taken place. Furthermore, visual inspection did not ﬁnd any indication or
evidence to support this fact. To answer the third possibility, themetallurgical analysis was subsequently performed andwill
be discussed in detail in the following section.
Visual inspections were carried out using photos and on the physical pipe specimen provided (Fig. 3). This pipe section
was resting on the lower C-support. Failure areas marked on the failed specimen were cracked opening, abrasion marks,
near-to-ﬂat area and visible slopes on both ends.
Fig. 4 shows actual location of the pipe portion that is resting on the C-support. The semi-circular shaped surface on this
support is visible and indicates a material loss for both the pipe and the C-support.
In addition,minor corrosion and excessive scrappingmarks on the sides of the pipe can also be seen. This situation further
deteriorates the condition of the resting pipe.
4.2. Analysis of pipe’s failed section
Visual assessment of the position of the damaged part led us to conclude that the pipe damagewas directly caused by the
impact of the high pressure raw gas jet that gushed through. Therefore, further metallurgical/physical analysis of the pipe
failure was conducted to analyze the steel pipe failure. The following testings were carried out to accomplish the task:
[(Fig._3)TD$FIG]
Fig. 3. Portion of the pipe showing the failure area.
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i. Visual testing
ii. Penetrant testing (PT)
iii. Penetrant testing (PT)/magnetic particle testing (MPT)
iv. Microstructural analysis
4.2.1. Visual testing
The carbon steel gas pipe was inspected externally and internally and photo-documented. Dimensional mapping was
conducted and shown in Fig. 5a. The major failure area consists of approximately 45–50mm in length of reduced section of
pipe along with tapered edges on both sides of the cut. The depth of the reduced thickness portion varies from 3.1mm to
4.3mm on various locations, whereby, occurrence of the maximum thickness loss has led to the gas leakage from the
opening.Moreover, it is also clear from Fig. 5a that the abrasionmarks facing lower C-support and side support are not inline.
Fig. 5b shows the presence of metal ﬂakes around the boundary of the failure area. The direction of these ﬂakes is towards
outside with reference to the opening.
4.2.2. Penetrant testing (PT)/magnetic particle testing (MPT)
Fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) and magnetic particle testing (MPT) were performed on the fractured area of the
pipe section. Fig. 6 shows the damaged pipe section under UV light during MPT. This proved that cracks have only initiated
from the failed portion area due to the thickness loss and there are no further inherent defects.
[(Fig._4)TD$FIG]
Fig. 4. Actual pipe portion resting on C-support.
[(Fig._5)TD$FIG]
Fig. 5. (a) Approximate dimensions of the failure area resting on lower support and side abrasion region (Note: the smooth surface marks on right side are
due to post failure lab work) and (b) metal ﬂakes on boundary of the failure area.
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4.2.3. Ultrasonic thickness measurement (UTM)
Ultrasonic thickness measurement (UTM) was performed for the fractured pipe section. The UTM results have shown
marked variation in the thickness values at the vicinity of the fractured area. The thickness values vary from 1.48mm to
2.91mm. Marking plan and thickness variation are shown in Fig. 7 and Table 1 accordingly.
4.2.4. Hardness testing
Hardness is affected by the levels of heat input and preheat used during welding. Table 2 shows hardness values (HRB) at
selected locations of the failure region of the pipe. Apparently the unaffected portion has the highest hardness, 90 HRB, while
it reduced to the minimum value of 64 HRB at failure location. Scatter of the measured hardness data is primarily attributed
to the roughness of the eroded surface.
[(Fig._6)TD$FIG]
Fig. 6. Fractured pipe area through UV light after magnetic particle testing (MT).
Table 1
Ultrasonic thickness measurement (mm) for fractured pipe section.
A B C D E
1 2.86 1.67 1.88 1.65 2.07
2 – – – 1.87 2.88
3 2.91 1.69 1.48 1.87 2.38
Table 2
Hardness numbers (HRB) at different locations of the failure region (cf. Fig. 7).
A B C D E
1 76 64 74 82 78
2 76 – – 60 90
3 70 81 71 90 90
[(Fig._7)TD$FIG]
Fig. 7. Marking plan for UTM.
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4.2.5. Microstructural analysis
Microstructural examination of the gas pipe was undertaken to determine possibility of microstructural deﬁciencies
of the pipe at the failure region. If the results reveal consistency of microstructural arrangement at the failure region
comparedwith another section away from the failure (basemetal), then it can be concluded that erosion is themain cause of
the pipe failure.
This task was carried out by examining the fractured area with stereo microscope. Fig. 8a and b shows that cracks
nucleated from the edges of the opening due to post wall thinning nominal vibrations. Additionally, it can be seen that the
surface texture of the failure area is a blend of shiny and uneven proﬁle (Fig. 8c). Prepared specimenwas also then examined
with 200 magniﬁcation using Nikon optical metallographic microscope.
Examination of the microstructure at the failure region and the base metal location clearly indicate close similarity
between both specimens that consist the typical ferrite and pearlite structure observed in carbon steels. There is also no
evidence of micro fractures (Fig. 9a and b). These ﬁndings fully support the hypothesis that the pipe failed due to the
increased turbulence caused by abrasive grindings and its adjacent regions and erosion-corrosion phenomenon was
aggravated due to faulty workmanship erosion instead of corrosion.
[(Fig._8)TD$FIG]
Fig. 8. Fracture surface analysis by stereo microscope.
[(Fig._9)TD$FIG]
Fig. 9. Optical micrograph of (a) fractured area and (b) base metal at 200.
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5. Discussion
The CS pipematerial cracked from the internal surfacewhichwas in contactwith raw gas. The crack propagated primarily
circumferentially and transversed through the pipe wall thickness, allowed strong jetting effect and resulted in leakage.
Concluding discussion is as follows:
i. In addition to pipe contactwith the C-support, Figs. 10 and 11 show that the pipewas also in contactwith inner L-support.
This leads to a hypothesis that there may be signiﬁcant amount of axial movement during the service. However, this
theorywas nulliﬁed by our earlier observed scrappingmarks (Fig. 5a) on the pipewhich indicates that the abrasionmarks
on lower and side facings on the pipe are not inline. This shows that any linear movement along the length of the piping
during the service could not be the cause of failure. The reason is both motions should have been taken simultaneously.
ii. Based on the inspection results, it was observed that the failed surface does not indicate any metallurgical failure, and
hence could be a foremost basis of failure. The surface texture on the main failure area shows grinding marks (Fig. 11).
This leads to a conclusion that the main failure area on the piping could be due to manual grinding.
iii. C-channel support was excessively grinded for proper placement of piping, resulting in severe thickness loss of pipe from
the grinded surface. Moreover, two side supports were also welded on C-channel support to avoid its to and fro
movement.
[(Fig._11)TD$FIG]
Fig. 11. Inner and outer L-supports.[(Fig._12)TD$FIG]
Fig. 12. Shining and uneven proﬁle of failure area.
[(Fig._10)TD$FIG]
Fig. 10. Actual location of the L-supports on C-support.
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Shining and uneven proﬁle of failure area can be seen in Fig. 12. It is also observed that pipe surface adjacent to the
failure region was also excessively grinded, as shown in Fig. 13.
iv. The geometry and location of the excessive grinding at the failure and its adjacent regions of the pipe, base area of the
C-channel and L-shaped side supports, clearly indicate that these grindings might have been performed to accommodate
the pre-installed piping spool to avoid the alteration in pipe position to sit properly on support.
6. Conclusion and recommendations
In reference to the existing evidence deduced from the tests and substantial existing data the study revealed that the root
cause of the pipe failures is attributed to the initial leak of the raw gas pipe. From the basic pipe material properties and
behaviour, it is suspected that the failure was initiated by a crack, most probably longitudinal in nature. The crack or
horizontal slit allowed high pressure gas to jet through, with the jet momentum getting stronger as the effective diameter of
the slit increased. Over time the crack enlarges and breaks off into large chunk, resulting in the gaping hole as evident in the
phot record. In view of crack initiation and propagation, it is concluded that the root cause for the failure of the pipe section is
due to excessive thinning as a result of thickness reduction by intentional grinding. Further damage to the surface of already
excessively reduced thickness occurred due to nominal pipe vibration during service.
Based on the above, it is recommended that during installation/fabrication of piping system, proper procedures may be
implemented, followed by visual inspection through qualiﬁed inspector(s) including pre-service and in-service inspection.
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Fig. 13. Grinding marks on side surface of pipe.
M.A. Khattak et al. / Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 7 (2016) 1–88
